

Spontaneous recovery in dynamic networks

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
Outline




Motivation



Model



Numerical results and theory



Real networks: empirical support



Discussion and conclusion



Interactions and connections


- elementary particles
- atoms
- molecules
- planets, stars, galaxies...



NETWORKS:

Interactions between individual units in :

- society
- biology
- finance
- infrastructure & traffic



Many, many models on the question: How do networks fail?

Motivation

Recovery?

1. We can repair it by hand
2. It recovers spontaneously

In many real-world phenomena such as

- traffic jams suddenly easing
- people waking from a coma
- sudden market crashes in finance

after it fails, the network is seemingly being able to **become spontaneously active again**.

→ The process often occurs repeatedly: ***collapse, recovery, collapse, recovery,...***




MODEL

We have a network: each node can be **active** or **failed**.

We suppose there are **TWO possible reasons for the nodes' failures**:
INTERNAL and EXTERNAL.

INTERNAL failure: intrinsic reasons inside a node


EXTERNAL failure: damage “imported” from neighbors



RECOVERY: A node can also **recover** from each kind of failure; suppose there is some **characteristic time of recovery** from each kind of failure.


INTERNAL FAILURES

p- rate of internal failures (per unit time, for each node).
During interval dt , there is probability pdt that the node fails.




A node recovers from an internal failure after a time period τ .

INTERNAL FAILURES - independent process on each node



LEFT: Observing one node during time.



A relevant quantity is the **fraction of time during which the node is internally failed**. Lets call this quantity p^* , $0 < p^* < 1$.

This would make a nice problem for a course in statistics.
We just give the result:


$$p^* \equiv 1 - \exp(-p\tau)$$

→ It turns out we will need only a single parameter, p^* , to describe internal failures.

Let's remember p^* !

EXTERNAL FAILURES – if the neighborhood of a node is too damaged


- a) “HEALTHY” neighborhood (**def: more than m active neighbors, where m is a fixed threshold parameter**): there is no risk of externally- induced failures
- b) CRITICALLY DAMAGED neighborhood (**def: less than or equal to m active neighbors**): there is a probability $r dt$ that the node will experience externally-induced failure during dt .



r - external failure probability (per unit time, for nodes with critically damaged neighborhood)


A node recovers from an external failure after time τ' . We set $\tau'=1$ for simplicity.

Network evolution: combination of internal and external failures, and recoveries.



Network is best described with a **fraction of active nodes**, $0 < \mathbf{Z} < 1$.



Only 3 quantities to remember:





Model simulation [Random regular networks]

$\langle Z \rangle$ - average fraction of active nodes (during time it fluctuates)





We fix r , and measure how $\langle z \rangle$ changes as we change p^* .

For some values of r we have hysteresis.




Simulation results

$\langle Z \rangle$ - dynamical average of the fraction of active nodes



Phase diagram



Blue line: critical line (spinodal) for the abrupt transition $I \rightarrow II$

Red line: critical line (spinodal) for the abrupt transition $II \rightarrow I$

In the hysteresis region both phases exist, depending on the initial conditions or the memory/past of the system.



THEORY (short overview)


Denote the events of failures as

$A = \{\text{internal failure}\},$

$B = \{\text{external failure}\}.$

The probability z_k that a randomly-chosen node of degree k has failed is:

$$1 - z_k = P(A) + P(B) - P(A \cap B)$$



Assume that internal and external failures are approx. independent events, then

$$1 - z_k = P(A) + P(B) - P(A)P(B)$$

$P(A)$ is just p^* , and $P(B)$ can be calculated using a mean field theory and combinatorics.

Basic idea for $P(B)$:

In the **mean field theory**, every neighbor has probability **z to be active and $1-z$ to be failed** (no matter what degrees these nodes might have -"average neighbor").


Using combinatorics $P(B)$ can be expressed as a function of the **mean field z** and node degree k .

After summing over all k -s, all z_k sum up to z , the result is a self consistency equation of the form:

$$z = f[z(p^*, r)]$$

Depending on p^* and r we have either:

- 1 solution (pure phase)
- 3 solutions (2 physical sol., corresponding to the hysteresis region)




Finite size effects: qualitatively different physics

A small network with around $N=100$ nodes: in the hysteresis region we get switching between the two phases:

Sudden transition!

1. Why?? How??


2. Is there any prewarning?




Z = Fraction of active nodes measured in time.

Finite size effects: qualitatively different physics

Time dynamics:




Probab. distribution:




We find the exact mechanism of the phase switching.

How does the network react when p^* is abruptly changed?



The system has a specific relaxation time, λ .

Because of the **stochastic nature of internal and external failures**, fraction of internally (or externally) failed nodes is actually fluctuating around the equilibrium values: p^* and r .



It is natural to define the moving average:

$$p_{\lambda}^*(t)$$

We hypothesize that the “true” value of p^* that the system sees, is this moving average

→ **slow, adiabatic change.**



For the external failures we can define an analogous moving average:

$$r_{\lambda}(t)$$

This defines the trajectory $(r_\lambda(t), p_\lambda^*(t))$!

Let's observe this trajectory in the phase diagram (white line, see below).

The trajectory crosses the spinodals (critical lines) interchangeably, and causes the phase flipping.









Real networks: empirical support

Economic networks: Networks of companies.

Indian
BSE 200




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Mapping: z is defined as a fraction of companies with positive returns, measured in moving intervals to capture fundamental changes rather than speculations.

“Bonus” phenomenon: Flash crashes


An interesting by-product produced by the model:




Sometimes the network rapidly crashes, and then quickly recovers.

“Bonus” phenomenon: Flash crashes

Model predicts the existence of “flash crashes”.



Real stock markets also show a similar phenomenon.
Q: Possible relation?



“Flash Crash 2010”

Future work:

- We are extending the model on interdependent networks.

Preliminary results show a complicated phase diagram with 6 critical lines and two critical points.

Mean field theory self-consistent equation for Z:

$$z(p^*, r) = 1 - p^* - r(1 - p^*) \sum_k f_k \sum_{j=0}^m \binom{k}{j} z^j (1 - z)^{k-j}$$